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User fees or equity funds in low-income countries
In last week’s Lancet, Bruno Meessen and colleagues
1 
compared fundamentally diﬀ  erent  approaches  to 
redress the unfairness towards poor individuals that 
characterises health systems in low-income countries: 
equity funds and abolition of user fees. In Cambodia, 
an equity fund was established to enable the poorest 
patients in hospitals to be exempted from health-care 
and transport fees. By contrast, user fees in Uganda 
were abolished at all levels of the health system for all 
patients.
Both experiments sharply increased attendance by 
poor patients. Two crucial diﬀ  erences merit discussion. 
First, the Cambodian system recognised that ﬁ  nancial 
barriers in health-care access include indirect costs such 
as transport or opportunity costs. By only abolishing 
user fees, the Ugandan experiment neglected this point. 
Transport as a proportion of total patients’ costs can 
be high,
2 especially in developing countries (28% in 
Burkina Faso, 25% in northeast Brazil). In Tanzania, costs 
of transport were so high that “the substantial costs in 
time and eﬀ  ort and the money spent on travel make it 
unjustiﬁ  able to introduce charges on the grounds that 
it would discourage frivolous use of services”.
3 Thus 
the abolition of user fees does not resolve all ﬁ  nancial 
barriers for poor patients. However, user fees are a major 
part of the reason why the poorest groups are excluded 
from health care, and alternatives need to be found.
Second, use of performance-based payment in 
Cambodia is increasingly advocated by donors such 
as the World Bank to improve health-care delivery. 
Performance-based payment has been praised for 
overcoming the limitations of per-capita fees (leading 
to under-provision of services) and fees for services 
(leading to over-provision of services). Meessen and 
colleagues point out that the removal of user fees in 
Uganda removed the incentive for providers to aim for 
quality care. This observation assumes that patients can 
inﬂ  uence quality of providers through payment. The 
fundamental question is why such ﬁ  nancial in  centives 
should come from patients, especially from those least 
able to pay. Since Meessen and colleagues, among many 
others, accept that user fees are regressive, discussion of 
other funding mechanisms to support incentives, such 
as capitation, would be useful.
Meessen and colleagues’ article sits at a crucial 
moment in the debate about access to health care for 
poor people in low-income countries. Donors and health 
economists have advocated user fees since the 1980s 
as a sustainable and cost-eﬀ  ective  health-ﬁ  nancing 
mechanism able to constrain health-care demand in 
resource-scarce countries.
4 Individual studies claiming 
to show beneﬁ  ts of user fees, such as curtailing frivolous 
demand for health care,
5 encouraging individuals to 
take responsibility for their health (including preventive 
behaviour),
6 and reducing inappropriate use of referrals,
7 
have been repeatedly contradicted. Rice and Morrison
8 
and Sepehri and Chermonas,
9 among others, have 
shown that prob  lems with eﬃ   ciency and equity persist 
with user fees. User fees are not always cost eﬀ  ective: 
national systems have generated an average of only 
5% of total recurrent health-system expenditure,
10 
and necessary as well as unnecessary demand for care 
is constrained.
 The RAND Health Experiment—a large 
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randomised study in the 1970s in the USA—showed 
that health-service use fell as cost-sharing increased. 
However, there were reductions in both ineﬀ  ective and 
eﬀ  ective services, and poorer health outcomes overall.
11 
Also, supply-side incentives (ie, for health workers) 
might be more eﬃ   cient at constraining demand than 
demand-side incentives (ie, for patients).
12 For equity, 
because health care has been argued to be an essential 
good, the demand for it will not fall with price (ie, 
price inelasticity), and people in the lowest income 
quintile have shown to be highly responsive to even 
small changes in price.
13 Hence, even very small fees 
can reduce their access, and exemption mechanisms 
for these groups have repeatedly failed.
9 Médecins 
Sans Frontières studied prices paid in several sub-
Saharan African countries at public-health centres that 
applied user fees for primary care,
14–16 and found that 
the fees represented a substantial share of household 
expenditure (equivalent to 12–30 days of expenses), 
forcing many families to borrow money or sell goods.
All this information begs the question of why we still 
need to argue about user fees. The discussion is an old 
one,
17 but unfortunately still relevant. The debate has 
regained intensity in view of the international agenda 
for poverty alleviation and the Millennium Development 
Goals, and Meessen and colleagues’ article is a useful 
addition. Several donors have ack nowledged the failings 
of user fees, some at least rhetorically (World Bank), and 
others are adapting their aid-policy implementation 
(UK Department for International Development). 
Some countries have recently abolished user fees fully 
(Uganda, Zambia) or partly (Burundi, Niger). Yet, user 
fees remain in most of sub-Saharan Africa, often publicly 
denounced by donors but privately accepted as the only 
viable option if poor countries are not to spend more 
than their domestic resources allow.
Health economists and donors are now focusing on 
community-based health insurance, which is deﬁ  ned 
as any scheme with voluntary membership that uses 
prepayment for health care by community members.
18 
However, the fundamental question remains—who will 
pay for those unable to aﬀ  ord it?
Meessen and colleagues rightly conclude that no 
one solution can improve access for poor individuals 
worldwide. However, they point out that context-
speciﬁ  c solutions are attainable. It is time to learn from 
the accumulated evidence from the past two decades 
and follow up with action to eﬀ  ectively  overcome 
ﬁ  nancial barriers for the world’s poorest populations.
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